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Zoning and Land Use Planning
Michael Lewyn*
ARE WIDE STREETS NEGLIGENT?
American commercial streets are typically designed to
encourage motorists to drive as rapidly as possible; major
streets can be as many as six or eight lanes wide.1 Such wide
streets encourage drivers to drive so rapidly that pedestrians
often die when struck by automobiles.2
Traditionally, tort law has not impeded the anti-pedestrian
orientation of American streets. Courts and juries rely on
guidelines set by the American Association of Highway and
Transportation Ofﬁcials (AASHTO), a national association of
state and local transportation ofﬁcials.3 AAHSTO guidelines
have traditionally favored wide streets that encourage highspeed trafﬁc.4 As a result, some transportation planners assume that in order to avoid tort liability, they must build
such streets.5 This perception is probably inaccurate, both
because AASHTO guidelines have become more ﬂexible over
time, and because in most states, sovereign immunity
precludes liability for discretionary policy decisions.6
But one recent case suggests that transportation planners
may actually risk tort liability by building streets designed
*Associate Professor, Touro Law Center. B.A., Wesleyan University,
J.D., University of Pennsylvania; L.L.M., University of Toronto.
1

See, e.g., Angie Schmitt, Miami Hosted “Safe Streets” Summit- Yet
Still Hasn’t Fixed Its Unsafe Streets, Streetsblog, Feb. 26, 2019, at https://
usa.streetsblog.org/2019/02/26/miami-hosted-safe-streets-summit-yet-hasn
t-ﬁxed-its-unsafe-streets/ (Miami’s Biscayne Boulevard has eight lanes);
infra note _.
2

See infra notes 12–16 and accompanying text (describing relationship between high speeds and severe injuries to pedestrians).
3

See infra note 17 and accompanying text.

4

See infra note 11 and accompanying text.

5

See infra note 18 and accompanying text.

6

See infra notes 19, 32 and accompanying text.
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for fast trafﬁc: in the 2016 case of Turturro v. City of New
York,7 the New York Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict
against a city because the city failed to engaged in “trafﬁc
calming measures [to] deter drivers . . . from speeding”8
Thus, it appears that cities that seek to accommodate highspeed trafﬁc might actually be increasing, rather than
decreasing, their risk of tort liability.
Part I of this article discusses the history of American
street design, and the negative side effects of 20th-century
policies favoring high-speed streets. Part II discusses the
Turturro case and a more recent New York case distinguishing Turturro. Part III explains the limits of the Turturro
holding in more detail.

I.

BACKGROUND

In 1914, state and local highway ofﬁcials formed the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Ofﬁcials (AASHTO).9 AASHTO has been drafting guidelines for
transportation planners since 1931. 10 Historically, these
guidelines have favored wide streets and high-speed trafﬁc.
For example, a 1957 AASHTO manual proposed that major
streets have six to eight lanes- far more than most pre-World
War II streets.11
Such wide streets made walking difﬁcult and dangerous,
for several reasons. First, each additional travel lane adds a
few seconds to pedestrian travel, thus increasing the amount
of time walkers are exposed to high-speed trafﬁc.12 Second,
wide streets make it easier for drivers to travel at rapid
7

Turturro v. City of New York, 28 N.Y.3d 469, 45 N.Y.S.3d 874, 68
N.E.3d 693 (2016).
8

Id. at 485, 68 N.E. 3d at 705, 45 N.Y.S. 3d at 775.

9

See Michael Lewyn, Why Pedestrian-Friendly Street Design is Not
Negligent, 47 U. Louisville L. Rev. 339, 342 (2008) (citation omitted). At
the time of its formation, the organization was known as the American Association of State Highway Ofﬁcials (AASHO). Id.
10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Id. at 342. See also Id. at 350–54 (describing other anti-pedestrian
features in AASHTO manuals, such as suggestions of high speed limits on
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speeds,13 which in turn increases trafﬁc-related danger in a
variety of ways. A motorist driving at thirty miles per hour
has a 150-degree ﬁeld of vision; by contrast, a motorist driving at sixty miles per hour has only a 50-degree ﬁeld of version, and as a result may have difﬁculty noticing other road
users.14 Moreover, a motorist who does notice another road
user may have difﬁculty stopping in time to avoid a collision
if he or she is driving at a high speed. For example, someone
who is driving at forty miles per hour will not be able to stop
without traveling 120 feet; by contrast, someone who is driving twenty miles per hour can come to a stop within 40 feet
of noticing another road user.15 Finally, high speeds increase
the odds of death when collisions do occur: a pedestrian hit
by a vehicle traveling ﬁfteen miles per hour has a 3.5 percent
chance of death, while one struck by a vehicle traveling at
forty-four miles per hour has an 83 percent chance of death.16
Some courts have held that failure to comply with
AASHTO guidelines is evidence of negligence.17 As a result,
transportation planners have historically relied on AAHSTO
guidelines, because they feared that if they did not do so,
busiest streets, support for large parking lots, and hostility towards street
trees).
13

See Turturro v. City of New York, 28 N.Y.3d 469, 485, 45 N.Y.S.3d
874, 886, 68 N.E.3d 693, 705 (2016) (“it was known among trafﬁc engineers
that straight, wide roads . . . encourage speeding because drivers feel
more comfortable on roadways with those characteristics”); Stephen H.
Burrington, Restoring the Rule of Law and Respect for Communities in
Transportation, 5 N. Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 691, 694 (1996) (trafﬁc engineers
build wide streets out of “solicitude for fast trafﬁc”).
14

See Lewyn, supra note 9, at 344.

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

See, e.g., Kleinman v. Buzzeo, 56 Misc. 3d 200, 203, 50 N.Y.S.3d
841, 843 (Sup 2017) (holding that “noncompliance with such highway
construction guidelines may form the basis . . . for liability under
principles of common law negligence” but noting that New York courts
divided on this issue); Harris v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. and Development, 997 So. 2d 849, 865 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2008), writ denied, 999 So.
2d 785 (La. 2009) (“whether [government] has conformed to the applicable
AASHTO standards is a relevant factor in determining the ultimate issue
of whether the highway is unreasonably dangerous.”).
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injured motorists might recover damages against municipalities for negligent street design.18
However, it no longer makes sense for planners to rely on
AASHTO manuals to support anti-pedestrian street design
policies, for several reasons. First, discretionary function
tort immunity protects most governments from liability for
discretionary policy decisions, such as decisions to favor pedestrian safety over high-speed trafﬁc.19 Second, another
planning organization, the Institute of Transportation
Engineers (ITE), has issued its own manual of recommended
practices, which tends to favor slower trafﬁc and more
pedestrian-oriented streets.20 Third, AASHTO’s own guidelines have evolved in recent years. Portions of the 2018
guidelines have been revised to “emphasize transportation of
people, rather than focusing primarily on moving vehicles
. . . [and to place] greater emphasis on lower-speed, walkable, urban zones.”21 Even the 2011 guidelines acknowledge
that streets in developed urban areas should be designed for
lower speeds than rural streets with less pedestrian trafﬁc.22
But even if planners’ manuals now allow narrower, more
walkable streets, they do not necessarily require such
streets. However, the Turturro case seems, at ﬁrst glance, to
do exactly that.
18

See Lewyn, supra note 9, at 339.

19

Id. at 358–61.

20

Id. at 362–63.

21

American Association of State Highway and Transportation Ofﬁcials, A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets, 7th Edition
Summary of Key Revisions and Updates, at http://downloads.transportatio
n.org/publications/GDHS-7_SummaryOfChanges.pdf.
22

See American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Ofﬁcials, A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets 7-27 (6th
ed. 2011) at http://www.academia.edu/33524500/AASHTO_Green_Book_
2011.PDF (although arterial streets generally designed to support 30-60
mile per hour trafﬁc, “[l]ower speeds apply in central business districts
and in more developed areas, while higher speeds are more applicable to
outlying suburban and developing areas.”) (emphasis added). On the other
hand, the 2011 manual emphasized that “the typical range [for such
streets is] . . . four to eight through lanes”. Id. at 7-30. Arterial streets
are typically the busiest streets. Id. at 7-27 (arterials serve “major activity
centers”).
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II. RECENT CASE LAW ON SPEED AND
STREET DESIGN
On December 5, 2004, 12-year-old Anthony Turturro was
riding a bicycle in Gerritsen Avenue in Brooklyn, New York,
when he was struck by a motorist who was driving 54 miles
per hour.23 Gerritsen Avenue has four lanes, and the speed
limit is 30 miles per hour.24 In addition to suing the motorist,25 Turturro and his mother26 sued the city, presenting evidence that speeding was common on Gerritsen Avenue and
that the city had not studied “trafﬁc calming” measuresthat is, measures such as street humps and narrower street
lanes that are likely to slow down trafﬁc.27 The plaintiffs also
presented evidence that the city had received several letters
from neighborhood residents and elected ofﬁcials complaining about speeding on Gerritsen Avenue.28 The jury found
that the defendants were negligent and responsible for 90
percent of the damages.29 The city moved to set aside the
verdict, and the trial court denied the city’s motion as to
liability.30 An appellate court and the New York Court of Appeals (the state’s highest court) both afﬁrmed judgment for
the plaintiffs.31
The ﬁrst question the court addressed was what sort of
immunity, if any, was appropriate under New York law.
23

Turturro v. City of New York, 28 N.Y.3d 469, 474–75, 45 N.Y.S.3d
874, 878–79, 68 N.E.3d 693, 697–98 (2016).
24

Id. at 475, 68 N.E. 2d at 698, 45 N.Y.S. 3d at 879.

25

Id.

26

Id. at 477, 68 N.E. 2d at 699, 45 N.Y.S. 3d at 880 (noting that
mother sued for “loss of services”).
27

Id. at 475, 68 N.E. 2d at 698, 45 N.Y.S. 3d at 879.

28

Id.

29

Id. at 476, 68 N.E. 2d at 699, 45 N.Y.S. 3d at 880 (jury “apportioned
10% of the liability to Anthony, 50% to Pascarella [the speeding motorist]
and 40% to the City.”).
30

Id. at 477, 68 N.E. 2d at 699, 45 N.Y.S. 3d at 880. However, the
court reduced the damages verdict. Id.
31

Id. at 477, 68 N.E. 2d at 699–700, 45 N.Y.S. 3d at 880–81. However,
the appellate court modiﬁed the judgment by deleting the award to
Anthony Turturro’s mother, and further reducing the damages awarded.
Id. at 477, 68 N.E. 2d at 700, 45 N.Y.S. 3d at 880.
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Under New York law, immunity may depend on whether the
government’s function is classiﬁed as “proprietary” or
“governmental.” In New York (unlike in most other states)32
discretionary function immunity is limited to policy decisions involving governmental functions.33 Because New York
law deﬁnes the duty to keep streets in safe condition as a
proprietary function,34 New York municipalities are more
likely than cities in other states to be liable for negligence
that causes unsafe streets.35
The city argued that motorist speeding arose from police
failure to enforce trafﬁc laws, which involves the governmental function of police protection rather than the proprietary
function of street design.36 The court rejected this view,
because the negligent act alleged by the plaintiffs was the
failure to implement trafﬁc calming, rather than the failure
to allocate adequate police resources to speed limit
enforcement. 37 The court added that the success of the
plainiffs’ claim “depended, in part, upon the jury’s conclusion
that the City had attempted to address the speeding problem
through police enforcement, but that police enforcement was
not successful in controlling speeding down the length of
Gerritsen Avenue, and the City therefore had an obligation
to use [trafﬁc calming].”38
One exception to the New York rule that cities are not immune for negligence related to proprietary functions exists
when “a duly authorized public planning body has entertained and passed on the very same question of risk as would
ordinarily go to the jury.”39 However, the court held that this
exception was inapplicable because even though the city did
32

See 2 Barry A. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation,
sec. 16.22 (2018 update) (proprietary/governmental distinction “has been
rejected by most jurisdictions”).
33

See Turturro v. City of New York, 28 N.Y.3d 469, 479, 45 N.Y.S.3d
874, 882, 68 N.E.3d 693, 701 (2016) (citation omitted).
34

Id., 68 N.E. 2d at 701, 45 N.Y.S. 3d at 882.

35

Id. at 480, 8 N.E. 2d at 701–02, 45 N.Y.S. 3d at 882-83 (citations
omitted).
36

Id. at 480, 68 N.E. 2d at 702, 45 N.Y.S. 3d at 883.

37

Id. at 481, 68 N.E. 2d at 702, 45 N.Y.S. 3d at 883.

38

Id. at 486, 68 N.E. 2d at 706, 45 N.Y.S. 3d at 887.

39

Id. (emphasis in original).
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study the possibility of installing trafﬁc control signals on
Gerritsen Avenue, it did not study trafﬁc calming.40 The court
added that this exception did not cover every single case
where a city studied a problem, because a city may be liable
if its study is “plainly inadequate.”41
The court went on to address the substantive issue of
whether the city’s negligence caused the collision. The city
argued that the motorist’s speeding “was the sole proximate
cause of the accident.”42 The court disagreed, because the
motorist’s behavior was itself “a foreseeable consequence of
the city’s failure to implement trafﬁc calming measures”43
and therefore did not break the chain of causation.
The city also argued that plaintiffs had not shown that
trafﬁc calming would have prevented the collision at issue.44
The court rejected this argument, pointing out that even the
city’s expert admitted that “people generally drive faster on
wide, straight roadways . . . [and that] trafﬁc calming
measures are intended to reduce the overall ‘curve’ of
speed.” 45 Accordingly, the jury could reasonably “have
concluded that trafﬁc calming measurers deter drivers such
as [the motorist in this case] from speeding, and that the
City’s failure to conduct a trafﬁc calming study was a
substantial factor in causing the accident.”46
On the other hand, one of New York’s intermediate appellate courts distinguished Turturro in the case of Enker v.
County of Sullivan.47 The Enker plaintiff was crossing a
street on foot when he was stuck by a vehicle.48 He then
40

Id. at 486–87, 68 N.E. 2d at 706–07, 45 N.Y.S. 2d at 887–88 (adding
that the city’s decision to study trafﬁc control signals were irrelevant
because “trafﬁc signals generally are not used to control speed”).
41

Id. at 486, 68 N.E. 2d at 706, 45 N.Y.S. 3d at 887.

42

Id. at 484, 68 N.E. 2d at 704, 45 N.Y.S. 3d at 885.

43

Id., 68 N.E. 2d at 705, 45 N.Y.S. 3d at 886.

44

Id., 68 N.E. 2d at 705, 45 N.Y.S. 3d at 886.

45

Id. at 485, 68 N.E. 2d at 705, 45 N.Y.S. 3d at 886.

46

Id. at 485, 68 N.E. 2d at 705, 45 N.Y.S. 3d at 887.

47

Enker v. County of Sullivan, 162 A.D.3d 1366, 79 N.Y.S.3d 722 (3d
Dep’t 2018).
48

Id., 79 N.Y.S. 2d at 723.
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sued a county for negligent intersection design,49 claiming
that the county should have prohibited parking and installed
a “No Pedestrian Crossing” sign near the site of the
accident.50
The court wrote that, as noted above,51 government agencies are immune from liability for negligent highway design
when they have studied “the same question of risk that
underlies the claim.”52 The court then held that in Enker,
unlike Turturro, the county had done exactly that, because
the plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s design of the
intersection endangered pedestrian safety,53 and the “defendant’s installation of pedestrian push signals at only two
cross streets was a deliberate and reasonable planning decision to ensure the safety of pedestrians while navigating the
subject intersection.”54 Thus, Enker stands for the proposition that government will not be liable for negligent street
designs if planners adopt a “deliberate and reasonable planning decision” to protect walkers.

49

Id.

50

Id. at 1368, 79 N.Y.S. 2d at 724.

51

See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.

52

Enker v. County of Sullivan, 162 A.D.3d 1366, 1368, 79 N.Y.S.3d
722, 724 (3d Dep’t 2018).
53

Id.

54

Id. I note that the court’s faith in pedestrian push signals was
almost certainly misplaced. A leading authority in the ﬁeld of pedestrianoriented city planning, Jeff Speck, writes that these signals cause walkers
“to get the message pretty quickly that they are second-class citizens.” Jeff
Speck, Walkable City Rules: 101 Steps to Making Better Places 178 (2018).
Cf. New Hampshire Institute of Art, NHIA Presents City Planner Jeff
Speck, at http://www.nhia.edu/about/news-and-events/news/jeff-speck-cityplanning-presentation (describing Speck’s credentials).
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III. WHAT THE CASE LAW DOES NOT
DO
After Turturro, pedestrian safety advocates proclaimed
that the decision would lead to increased use of trafﬁc
calming. For example, personal injury attorney Steve Vaccaro described the decision as a “game-changer.”55 Similarly,
transportation activist Paul Steely White said that Turturro
“puts an end to the notion that trafﬁc safety improvements
should be subject to debate and contingent on unanimous local opinion.”56
However, a variety of statements in both Turturro and
Enker limit government liability in cases involving highspeed streets. First, the Turturro court emphasized that its
decision rested upon New York’s narrow view of sovereign
immunity. In most states, street design decisions are immune from liability as long as they are related to discretionary policy decisions.57 In New York, this is not the case
because street design is a proprietary function.58 As a result,
Turturro has not been heavily cited outside New York.59
Second, even in New York, a city is immune from liability
if it has adequately studied pedestrian safety issues and
then adopted a plausible alternative. 60 Both Enker and
Turturro support this view. Enker held that a county was
55

Brad Aaron, State’s Highest Court Holds NYC Liable for Injuries on
Streets Without Trafﬁc Calming, Streetsblog, Jan. 5, 2017, at https://nyc.st
reetsblog.org/2017/01/05/states-highest-court-holds-nyc-liable-for-injurieson-streets-without-trafﬁc-calming/.
56

Id.

57

See supra notes 19, 32 and accompanying text.

58

Although New York is in the minority, it is not the only state that
adopts this view. See, e.g., Higgins v. City of Rockville, 86 Md. App. 670,
678–80, 587 A.2d 1168, 1172–73 (1991) (criticizing rule but acknowledging
that it is still good law in Maryland); T.C.A. 29-20-203(a) (abolishing immunity in Tennessee for “any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or
dangerous condition of any street, alley, sidewalk or highway, owned and
controlled by such governmental entity.”).
59

Of the thirty-one cases to date citing Turturro, not one was outside
New York.
60

I note that I have found no case applying Turturro to pedestrian/
vehicle collisions involving excessive speed. However, the cases that have
applied Turturro in other contexts have emphasized that liability turns on
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immune from liability to a pedestrian because it had made
“a deliberate and reasonable planning decision to ensure the
safety of pedestrians,”61 even though it had not adopted the
pedestrian safety measures sought by the plaintiff.62 By
contrast, the Turturro court emphasized that the city had
not even studied trafﬁc calming.63 Read together, these cases
suggest that a municipality that studies trafﬁc calming (unlike the Turturro defendant) but makes a deliberate and reasonable decision to adopt another policy (like the Enker
defendant) will avoid liability.
It therefore appears that a negligence claim based on a
government agency’s failure to calm trafﬁc is likely to fail if
(1) the claim arises is in a state that (unlike New York) applies discretionary function immunity in street design
lawsuits; or (2) the municipality has adequately studied pedestrian safety issues (especially if it has made some
minimal steps to protect pedestrians).64 It therefore appears
that a city may insulate itself from liability by studying pedestrian safety issues, and by adopting minimal safeguards
to protect pedestrians.

whether a municipality has studied the problem alleged by the plaintiffs.
See Cohen v. Macaya, 59 Misc. 3d 888, 892, 72 N.Y.S.3d 813 (Sup 2018) (in
case involving bicycle/pedestrian collision, court rejected city’s immunity
defense because city had not studied improvements that might have
prevented collision); Olenick v. City of New York, 56 Misc. 3d 389, 393–94,
52 N.Y.S.3d 839, 843 (Sup 2017) (in cases involving bicycle/pedestrian collision, court denies city’s motion for summary judgment because even
though the city was aware of such collisions near site of accident, it had
not yet conducted “a study regarding avoidance of bicycle/pedestrian
accidents”).
61

Enker, 162 A.D. 2d at 1368, 79 N.Y.S. 2d at 724.

62

Id. (plaintiff proposed to limit parking and pedestrian crossing of
street, while city instead chose to install pedestrian push signals).
63

See supra note 46 and accompanying text.

64

Because the Turturro court emphasized that police enforcement of
anti-speeding laws had not been particularly successful, see supra note 38
and accompanying text, it could be argued that a municipality is not liable
in cases where such police enforcement has not occurred. However, this
possibility is unlikely to be an obstacle to recovery, because police attempts to enforce anti-speeding laws are virtually universal.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

After Turturro, some supporters of street design reform
hoped that Turturro would usher in a new age of expanded
tort liability for planners who design wide, high-speed
streets, causing municipalities to slow down trafﬁc in order
to increase pedestrian safety. But both Turturro and Enker
suggest that this may not be the case. The Turturro court
emphasized that the municipal defendant in that case failed
to study trafﬁc calming measures, thus implying that planners who study and reject such policies may avoid liability.
Similarly, Enker emphasized that the city had adopted other
safeguards to protect pedestrian safety, and accordingly
found no liability.
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